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Armed forces all over the world need military equipment to support their security missions. 
Having a domestic defense industry is one approach that countries use to supply their 
armed forces’ requirements. The successful development of a domestic defense industry 
depends on many factors, but perhaps the most significant variable is the government. 
Because governments are both buyers and suppliers of national security, government 
policies are often designed by governments to support and regulate their domestic defense 
industries. This professional report explores the costs and benefits of various government 
policies to establish a sustainable defense industry. The report focuses on government 
policies in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and South Korea, because 
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Si vis pacem, para bellum means, “If you want peace, prepare for war.” This 
quotation is adapted from a statement by Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, a Roman writer 
in the fourth century (Milner, 1996). A critical part of military preparedness includes 
making or procuring defense equipment that countries hope they will never use. Building 
a credible defense force creates valuable deterrence.  
The problem that arises when countries equip their defense forces is whether to 
“make” or “buy.” A domestic defense industry offers the possibility of making defense 
equipment. The successful development of a defense industry depends on many factors, 
but perhaps the most significant variable is the government. Because governments are both 
buyers and suppliers, with the responsibility to guarantee national security, many policies 
are created by governments to support and regulate their defense industries. This 
professional report examines costs and benefits of defense industry policies. It identifies 
policies which are affordable and support a sustainable defense industry, and others which 
are unnecessarily costly and which could prove a burden to industry and the country.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Prior to delving into government policies and their impact on a domestic defense 
industry, the term “sustainability” must be defined. Based on the global defense industry 
classification provided by Bitzinger (Bitzinger, 2009), a sustainable defense industry can 
be categorized into one of three tiers: 
• Tier I is a defense industry that is able to support the basic needs of its 
country and achieve success in global market competition with little or no 
government involvement in its budget or protection policies. At this level, 
the defense industry is a critical innovator in the technology of arms 
suppliers. 
• Tier II is a defense industry that can provide only the basic needs of its 
country with government support of the budget and protection policies. At 
this level, the defense industry has adapted and modified technology to 
produce defense products by arms suppliers. 
• Tier III is a defense industry that can assist only its country’s basic needs 
due to a limited budget and dependency on government. At this level, the 
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defense industry has copied other countries’ arms equipment and produced 
the equipment without any further improvements (Bitzinger, 2009). 
Domestic defense industries enable countries to supply some or all of their own 
defense equipment needs. Because of this strategic function, many countries try to develop 
and protect their defense industries (Gansler, 1980). Governments routinely impose laws 
and regulations to protect their defense industries, take investment stakes in defense 
enterprises with a view to a voice in governance, or even take majority ownership or control 
outright. These measures, laws and regulations have often over-protected defense 
industries or even inadvertently restrained improvements in those defense industries 
(Dunne, 2009). This situation may lead the domestic defense industry to become stagnant 
within its tier, and increasingly dependent on government subsidies, becoming a fiscal 
burden on the government, and eventually leading to its collapse or bankruptcy. In 
attempting to provide security benefits through favorable regulation and subsidies of a 
domestic defense industry, the end result may be an unacceptably high cost to the 
government and the population. To avoid this outcome, the main function of government 
defense industry policies should be to make sure its domestic defense industry has a 
sustainable business model; only then can the domestic defense industry serve the country. 
Domestic defense industries in every country have their own comparative 
advantages, and governments, as the supporters of the defense industries, may be in a 
position to develop some advantages to help the defense industry become a successful 
business. This can happen if the government is able to provide the right policies and 
implement them wisely.  
The Netherlands is a good example of how a government supports its comparative 
advantage in naval shipbuilding. The Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) has been a blue 
water navy for centuries and has many types of ships, include frigates, submarines, mine 
hunters and minesweepers, supply ships, and amphibian vessels. All these ships have been 
built in Dutch shipyards. The Netherlands recently established a “national champions” 
policy to support its naval shipbuilding by giving a contract to the Dutch firm, Schelde 
Naval Shipbuilding. The contract was for four patrol vessels with a value of €240 million 
(Berkok, Penney, & Skogstad, 2012). The four patrol vessels were built for the RNLN. 
Schelde Naval Shipbuilding, itself a part of the Damen Shipyards Group, has successfully 
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exported ships worldwide. Thus, targeted defense contracts may help a domestic industry’s 
international competitiveness. 
Defense industries and governments cannot be separated if governments are the 
primary stakeholders in those industries. Therefore, the success of domestic defense 
industries generating benefits to countries depends on how governments create and apply 
the right policies, through a careful analytical process to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
those policies. 
Policies imposed by governments regarding their domestic defense industries 
should be analyzed and filtered based on the benefits and costs that they create, and then 
to ensure that the benefits outweigh the costs incurred to achieve desired outcomes. The 
result of this process will help identify appropriate policies that contribute to a sustainable 
and profitable domestic defense industry. 
B. OBJECTIVES  
This research explores the relationship between government policies and industries, 
especially the defense industry, to find out which policies might support a sustainable 
defense industry. We begin by defining sustainability, identifying factors that support 
defense industries, exploring how to measure sustainability, and then reviewing various 
government policies. We then analyze policies implemented by several exporter and 
importer countries of defense articles, and the countries’ successes or failures in sustaining 
their defense industries. The analysis continues by comparing the benefits and costs of 
implementing those policies, and recognizing which policies benefit defense industry 
sustainability, and which are likely to fail. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATION 
This research discusses business sustainability only in the defense industry, and 
does not discuss the overall security of countries nor specific details regarding their 
industrial policies. The focus is on government policies that impact the defense industry. 
Sustainable defense industries are analyzed and compared in order to determine whether 
beneficial aspects of government policies in arms-exporting countries may have 
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contributed to that success, and whether those policies might be appropriate for other 
countries. 
The countries referred to in this research are arms exporter countries, which are in 
tier I, tier II, and tier III categories, as described by Keith Klause (Bitzinger, 2009). The 
countries are the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and South Korea. These 
countries were selected because they have sustainable defense industries. Russia is also 
included as a tier I country, but limited data does not allow us to include it as a case study. 
South Korea was included in this research because it has significantly increased the number 
of companies that make up its defense industry and total defense sales, in just over a decade 
(2003–2013). 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The research for this project was conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, CA. The research uses existing data and literature on acquisition and 
procurement, economic development, and international trade, gathered from the Internet, 
previous research, and other primary sources. It includes 
1. a review of the literature about government industrial policies and infant 
industry protection 
2. an analysis of existing policies in countries that have successful and 
sustainable defense industries 
3. a comparison of policies between countries 
4. an analysis of the benefits and costs of these policies to help explain 
defense industry development and sustainability 
5. a determination on whether the research supports the hypothesis that cost-
effective government policies exist to promote a domestic defense 
industry 
6. a research report. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THESIS STATEMENT 
In this research project, the following questions are addressed: 
1. What is the definition of a sustainable business? 
2. What factors explain sustainability? 
3. What kind of government industrial policies are used in the defense sector, 
and what is their relationship to a sustainable defense industry? 
4. What unintended consequences appear most significant in creating a 
sustainable business in the defense industry?  
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5. What are examples of successful policies that countries create and 
implement to support their defense industries’ sustainable businesses? 
6. What policies fail to support a defense industry’s sustainability? 
7. What lessons, if any, can be learned from these countries? 
8. What are the costs and benefits generated from government policies 
targeting the defense industry? 
The domestic defense industry is a very valuable asset for a country because it can 
support the country’s need for arms to equip its military force. Defense and security are 
sensitive issues because they also relate to national identity (Gansler, 1980). As 
stakeholders in the defense industry, governments routinely initiate policies designed to 
support the industry’s sustainable business model. Based on the existing literature, a 
number of public policies are found in countries that have a defense industry. (Berkok, 
Penney, & Skogstad, 2012). However, most countries only apply a subset of these policies.  
There are several common and key policies that are responsible for the success and 
sustainability of a defense industry. Some countries successfully select policies that support 
a sustainable and profitable domestic defense industry. Unfortunately, in many other 
countries, government policies contribute to the industry suffering losses. 
This research defines the meaning of a sustainable business in the defense industry, 
and attempts to identify government policies that contribute to a sustainable and profitable 
defense industry. Successful policies are identified by analyzing the implementation of 
those policies in several countries that have proven to have sustainable and profitable 
defense industries, such as the United States, Western European countries, and other 
countries included in the top 100 arms-exporter countries listed by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). After identifying several key policies used 
in practice, this research explores the costs and benefits that countries realized when they 
implemented those policies.  
The costs must include opportunity costs. These are indirect costs that appear when 
government policies favor the defense industry. For example, facing budget constraints, if 
a government policy is to subsidize the defense industry, then the opportunity cost is the 
sacrifice of the next best alternative use of those funds in terms of other government 
programs or reduced taxes, etc. Following the analysis, this report summarizes the findings, 
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and offers recommendations for further research or implementation by other countries that 
might improve the sustainability and profitability of their defense industries.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I presented the problem and background of this project. Chapter II studies 
the defense industry and identifies factors that help determine business sustainability. 
Chapter III discusses government industrial policy and the role of government policy in 
the defense industry. Chapter IV provides an analysis of government industrial policies in 
the defense industry and reviews the implementation of these policies in several countries 
that export and import defense articles. It also compares the benefits and costs of various 
government industrial policies. Chapter V presents the results of the analysis and outlines 
government industrial policies that might contribute to a sustainable and profitable defense 
industry. It also recognizes the benefits and costs of the implemented policies and provides 
some recommendations for future research and policy implementation. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND BUSINESS 
SUSTAINABILITY 
According to the SIPRI, there is no exact definition of the defense industry; in fact, 
there is no standard industrial classification (SIC) of the defense industry. Based on a study 
of the literature, several commonalities can be used to identify the defense industry. The 
defense industry is a strategic industry for a country and is composed of several forms of 
ownership, such as a company owned by the state, a company owned by private 
shareholders, or private companies with a dominant share controlled by the government 
(Gansler, 1980). The products are in the form of defense equipment, maintenance, and 
repair services, and are either produced/sold alone or in combination, and are used 
primarily for national defense. Therefore, the defense industry, also called the military 
industry, is made up of government and commercial companies engaged in research, 
development, production, and service of equipment and military facilities (Kertofati, 
2012). The defense industry is a dynamic business that changes constantly to adapt to the 
ever-changing global situation. The defense industry continues to grow in importance as 
domestic and global situations change in terms of the economic, political, and military 
balance of power. As it did in the era before World War II, the Cold War era, and the era 
after the Cold War, the defense industry continues to adjust to ensure sustainability and 
profitability in the 21st century (Dunne, 2009).  
A. FIVE FACTORS IMPACTING THE GLOBAL DEFENSE INDUSTRY  
Various studies have been conducted to examine how well the defense industry is 
able to maintain profitability during its growth and become a sustainable business. These 
studies concluded that there are five basic factors that play a role in the development of the 
defense industry worldwide: 
1. The hierarchical nature of the global process of armaments production. 
2. The impact of military spending on the defense industry. 
3. The effect of the international arms trade. 
4. The process of defense-industrial globalization. 
5. The emerging information technologies–based revolution in military 
affairs (Bitzinger, 2009). 
 8 
These five factors are further discussed to gain insights into the development of the 
defense industry. 
1. The Hierarchical Nature of the Global Process of Armaments 
Production 
The defense industry is a business that often requires innovation and that controls 
or pioneers new technology to become a leader in the production of weapons until another 
technology is invented. In the defense industry, competition often creates a condition where 
the winner takes all. The conditions of competition, and differential mastery of technology 
and business continuity, create tiers in the defense industry. Experts have classified 
countries into several tiers: 
• Critical innovators, the highest tier, consist of countries that become 
pioneers in the technology of arms suppliers in the defense industry. 
• Adapters and modifiers refer to countries that adapt and modify the 
technology founded by critical-innovator countries and integrate the 
technology in their defense-industry products. 
• Copiers and reproducers is the tier for countries that copy and reproduce the 
technology from critical-innovator countries without conducting further 
improvements to the technology (Bitzinger, 2009). 
These tiers naturally create a hierarchy within arms-producing states. The first and 
second tiers are dominant in the global defense industry. It means that every change in 
these countries will have a tremendous effect on other defense industry businesses. The 
differences between these tiers are autonomy/independence, capital, and government 
influence. The first tier is more sustainable, earning large revenues (or receiving big 
budgets), needed to keep a leading position in new technology. Less government influence 
offers a greater advantage when companies compete in global markets. The second and 
third tiers are more vulnerable to technological changes, and may be especially vulnerable 
when government influence is high. Therefore, government policy in these tiers could play 
a more substantial role. 
Table 1 includes a description of the tiers experts use to categorize countries based 
on their defense industries. 
 9 
Table 1.   Defense Industry Tiers According to Several Experts (after 
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2. The Impact of Military Spending on the Defense Industry 
Military spending has a large effect on business sustainability in the defense 
industry because the consumers of defense industry products are mostly governments. 
After the Cold War, military budgets declined and the spending was cut or redirected to 
domestic social uses as the so-called peace dividend. This was caused by first-tier 
countries, which were involved in the Cold War, reducing the size do their militaries, 
followed by second-tier countries (including allies of first-tier countries). Peace is bad for 
defense business. The contraction of the dominant countries’ defense industries had a 
magnified impact on other global players (Dunne, 2009).  
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Beginning in 2000, military budgets began to rise again because of changes in the 
global and regional situation. Since then, in order to create a regional balance of power, 
many Southeast Asian countries have raised their defense budgets to provide deterrence to 
mitigate the risk of conflict. As an example, based on SIPRI data released in April 2014 
(Abuza, 2014), although global spending on militaries declined to $1.75 trillion in 2013, 
or 1.9% from 2012, the Southeast Asia region’s military spending continued to increase.  
This phenomenon can be explained by the regional situation in which China 
increased its military budget over 400% from $40 billion in 2004 to $188 billion in 2013. 
This acted as a trigger for other countries in the region to increase their military budgets, 
partly because territorial disputes over the South China Sea involve several countries in the 
region. Finally, global terrorism motivated many countries to prepare for unpredictable 
situations. After the 9/11 tragedy in the United States, the U.S. government raised its 
military budget significantly to combat terrorism in the world, and so did their allies in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to contribute to the fight against terrorism. 
These government policies had a significant impact in influencing the development of the 
global defense industry (Global Issues, 2013). 
3. Effects of the International Arms Trade and Barriers to Entry 
After the Cold War era, a drastic reduction in demand impacted the global defense 
industry as governments reduced the size of their militaries. The defense industry had to 
adjust its business strategy in order to maintain its existence and create sustainable 
businesses. Previously, their production was primarily for domestic government use, but 
along with global changes, some defense businesses discovered new markets, especially 
for international trade, which created new demand for their products (Dunne, 2009).  
The defense industry is in a special category of businesses because entering this 
business is not easy. According to Gansler (1980), there are 13 factors that act as barriers 
to entry, preventing new companies from entering this business: 
a. Marketing Problems 
Because the customer for this business is the government, an extremely diverse and 
dynamic organization with rapid change in personnel, it requires a deeper understanding 
of the way governments do business. Extremely talented individuals with great marketing 
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resources are necessary. For a new company, it is not easy to adapt to these unique 
marketplaces (Gansler, 1980). 
b. Inelastic Demand 
The demand in this market is defined by the budget and the number of troops. There 
is no assurance that the government will buy the product, and significant capital 
expenditures are needed to produce equipment and achieve economies of scale. These 
factors are a big burden for a new company (Gansler, 1980). 
c. Brand Loyalty 
When users are already familiar and satisfied with a certain defense company’s 
products, they get locked into a supplier, unwilling to take chances on new suppliers 
(Gansler, 1980). 
d. Demand for Higher Performance 
Defense equipment contracts often focus more on the improved performance of a 
product, than the price. Improving on another company’s products is a challenge for new 
firms in the industry (Gansler, 1980). 
e. Need for Engineering and Scientific Capability 
In major defense procurements, the process starts at the research and development 
(R&D) phase. If the result conforms to the requirements, then the process continues to the 
production phase. To join this business, a company needs to be capable of doing R&D, as 
well as engineering (Gansler, 1980).  
f. Existence of Expensive, Specialized Equipment 
Producing defense articles sometimes requires very specialized equipment, which 
is costly, especially for a new company. A government policy may provide this equipment 
only for certain companies in which they have an interest, creating unfair competition 
(Gansler, 1980). 
g. Need for Capital 
Building a company, especially for the defense industry, is costly. To obtain capital, 
a company needs access to financial markets. Unfortunately, high risks and unstable 
defense markets make for bad appraisals for a defense company, and relatively few 
financial institutions are likely to provide a new company with funding (Gansler, 1980). 
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h. Reporting and Other Overhead Requirements 
In the defense industry, government policy often requires extensive reporting 
requirements. The unique and costly government reporting standards can act as a barrier to 
entry, requiring extensive background and experience (Gansler, 1980).  
i. Market Environment 
In the defense industry, government policy sometimes involves the preservation of 
certain companies to guarantee (excess) capacity to reduce the risk of shortages and/or to 
ensure surge capability in time of conflicts. However, this can exclude and discourage 
newcomers from entering this business (Gansler, 1980). 
j. Political Considerations 
The defense industry is always influenced by politics. Government policies may be 
reflected in laws that regulate the number of companies that produce the same product in 
the country, or that favor certain companies at the expense of others (Gansler, 1980). 
k. Federal Regulations 
Government policy results in rules and regulations to protect the the defense 
industry. However, this action creates a barrier for other companies, especially private 
companies, that want to enter this industry (Gansler, 1980). 
l. Security Clearance 
In the defense industry, most employees have security clearances; the facilities 
themselves should be clear and secure, which also takes time and money and raises the 
costs to a new company (Gansler, 1980). 
m. Social Stigma 
There is a stigma about the defense industry with critics alleging that these 
companies, because they are involved with war and other non-peaceful activities, are 
responsible for human suffering. Any new company must acknowledge and be comfortable 
with resolving this moral dilemma (Gansler, 1980). 
These barriers create potential problems, and mainly benefitthe first tier of arms-
producing countries. Being in a lead position in this industry creates a variety of 
opportunities for them in international trade relations with second- and third-tier countries. 
Many developing countries tend to procure their defense equipment rather than produce it, 
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because of the significant effort required to overcome the entry barriers to building a new 
defense industry (Bitzinger, 2009). 
The strategy for many defense companies has changed from being domestic 
demand–oriented to being driven also by international demand, and defense industries now 
place a higher priority on international trade to expand sales and achieve economies of 
scale. International trade also creates a more competitive global market that tends to 
increase performance and reduce costs, but at the risk of arms proliferation. Motivated 
sellers are encouraged to enhance their R&D and develop new technologies in order to 
preserve their lead positions, and they may offer potential buyers incentives or offsets, such 
as transfers of technology, industrial participation or other unrelated offsets, joint 
investment opportunities, and more (Bitzinger, 2009).  
Besides international sales, another strategy to adapt to smaller defense budgets is 
to diversify production with civilian products. Four groups are identified as taking part in 
this strategy, with varying success based on company sales (Brzoska, Wilke, & Wulf, 
1999): 
1. Winners: This group increases its arms sales, as well as its civilian sales. 
2. Diversifiers: This group decreases its arms sales and increases its civilian 
sales. 
3. Re-armers: This group increases its arms sales and decreases its civilian 
sales. 
4. Losers: This group decreases its arms sales and decreases its civilian sales. 
Out of the top 100 arms-producing companies established in 1990, by 2003 only 53 
companies still existed (Bitzinger, 2009). The largest group that survived were categorized 
as “winners” with 25 companies, followed by “diversifiers” with 15 companies, then “re-
armers” with seven companies, and finally the “losers” with only six companies. The 
conclusion was that diversifying to civilian production is not always successful because 
many complex factors are involved in the successful implementation of this alternative. 
4. The Process of Defense-Industrial Globalization 
Globalization has become a critical issue in the defense industry, especially for 
purposes of a sustainable business. Constrained military budgets and huge improvements 
in technology as a result of continual R&D create an intensely competitive environment. 
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In order to survive, companies are required to find new ways to sustain their presence in 
the marketplace and overcome national boundaries. Defense industry companies need to 
create new linkages throughout the world to adapt to this competitive environment. These 
linkages take such forms as subcontracting projects with other international companies in 
order to achieve lower production costs, engaging in joint ventures with other companies, 
or acquiring foreign companies to support business development. This can be 
accomplished if governments provide the defense industry with policies that, while 
recognizing national security issues, support globalization since governments, politics, and 
social environments can all benefit from the success of this approach (Bitzinger, 2009). 
Globalization in defense technology and the industrial base affects the global arms 
market overall and raises concerns about security issues, including arms proliferation and 
changes in military doctrines, political points of view, and the shape of the domestic 
industrial base. Globalization can create vulnerabilities in certain countries, such that 
governments feel they must adopt defense industrial base policies that mitigate undesired 
outcomes (Bitzinger, 2009). 
5. The Emerging Information Technologies-Based Revolution in 
Military Affairs 
Continuous improvements in information systems and IT has created a revolution 
in military affairs, that contributes to building networks between countries and businesses. 
Innovation and improvements in technology have resulted in enormouschanges , especially 
in the areas of command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (C4ISR). By mastering this technology, the defense industry can create 
weapons that are specifically designed to increase a country’s deterrence power. A goal of 
some defense businesses is to create new technologies that make them leaders in the 
defense industry. This desire for improvement may lead to a significant transformation in 
the global defense industry. Governments, as stakeholders in the defense industry, should 
define clear constraints for this revolution to ensure that national security remains the 
highest priority (Bitzinger, 2009). 
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B. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
The last decade has seen many changes in the defense economy around the world. 
Some experts, including Walker and Grummet, claim that the defense industry has become 
an industry like any other in that it has been civilianized (as cited in Mawdsley, 2003, p. 
6). According to Mawdsley (2003), the expert De Vestel (1995) identified four arguments 
in favor of this hypothesis. First, the internationalization of defense industries has meant 
that some firms have moved away from operating within a national framework. Secondly, 
equally neo-liberal economic policies have an impact, to a greater or lesser extent, on 
national defense markets, introducing competition and free markets and constraining 
government ownership. Thirdly, it is less clear where the boundary between civilian and 
defense technology lies, or which is benefiting from which. Finally, De Vestel (1995) 
points out that post–Cold War reductions in European procurement budgets removed the 
safety net from the environment in which defense firms operated. 
This situation has motivated governments to take action in order to hedge against 
emergency situations where the governments might need the capacity of domestic 
companies to defend their countries. To maintain excess capacity for strategic hedging 
reasons, governments often provide regular procurement contracts every year just to 
maintain a company’s production capabilities. This action is usually not efficient because 
the scale of production is below the companies’ break-even cost, meaning they do not make 
a profit from their production. This, in turn, requires a government policy to subsidize these 
companies to keep them in business. Many other policies are imposed by governments to 
preserve the capability and capacity of key industries, from tailoring the procurement 
process, to providing capital infusions or other assets to keep those companies in business 
(Eland, 2001). 
Other experts claim defense firms are significantly different from normal firms. 
The demand side is the reason behind this belief because governments are often the primary 
customers. Governments not only act as buyers, but they also regulate the market. By using 
their power as the primary customer, they determine all major features of national defense 
industries, such as its size, structure, ownership, location, conduct, and performance 
(Hartley, 2015). Mawdsley (2003) also states that governments maintain their primary 
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customer role for domestic defense firms when they restrict export opportunities to avoid 
the dangers of arms proliferation. 
Thus, the defense industry is different from general industry. According to defense 
economists Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, the defense industry is characterized by “non-
competitive cost-based contracts, state-funded R&D, a protected market, guaranteed 
profits, and a culture of dependency rather than a culture of enterprise” (Sandler & Hartley, 
1995). The first four characteristics reflect government policies, the last reflects a possible 
cost of such policies. 
Governments hope that by supporting a defense industrial base they can also 
provide positive benefits for the country beyond the security sector, such as: 
(1) Financial Benefits 
Defense industrial activity can produce military equipment that provides value 
added to basic inputs that otherwise might be sold at lower prices. This has the potential to 
yield a greater profit than simply selling raw materials. For example, electronic 
components are much more expensive when they are sold together as a weapon control 
console compared with when they are sold as individual diodes, resistors, and so forth 
(Bitzinger, 2009). 
(2) Employment Opportunities 
The defense industry is usually a major industry because of the complexity of the 
equipment and materials used, the scope of work, and the high technology applied. This 
kind of industry requires highly educated human resources. As another consideration, the 
large number of components required in manufacturing military articles yields business 
opportunities for supporting sub-contractors and component industries. The existence of 
these industries provides employment opportunities for a variety of professionals (Sandler 
& Hartley, 1995). Job creation can create prosperity and increase the general welfare. 
However, the government faces the reality that to develop this industry, people have to 
acquire technical skills and become professionals. To help them acquire these skills, 
governments must also consider providing advanced education; otherwise, the eligible 
labor pool and the lack of professional workers, will result in high salaries for a few 
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qualified workers, and limit the potential of domestic defense companies. Some defense 
Industries try to overcome this problem by making their own investments in human 
resources. They dedicate funding to train their employees, converting them from unskilled 
workers to professionals, and use work contract agreements to keep those they have 
formed. 
(3) Exchequer Contribution 
Hartley (2015) mentions the exchequer contribution as one benefit of a domestic 
defense industry. The exchequer contribution could be in the form of tax receipts from 
home and overseas sales, such as income taxes, corporate taxes, as well as avoiding 
unemployment pay (if workers are able to stay with the company when projects are 
cancelled), (Hartley, 2015).  
(4) Opportunity to Obtain and Develop Cutting-Edge Technology 
Military equipment often relies on the latest technology. The existence of a defense 
industry provides an opportunity to master these technologies (Bitzinger, 2009). To 
compete with others, a firm will often try to develop the technology to build better products. 
It is sometimes possible for military technology to be spun off and used in other 
industries. For example, crypthography previously was reserved for military and security 
services and is now being implemented in civilian products. The development of valuable 
technologies can allow other industrial sectors to have competitive products that compete 
effectively with other companies, both domestically and abroad (Dunne, 2009). 
C. SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
After reviewing factors that influence the development of and changes to the 
defense industry, how can the defense industry implement long-term strategies to reach 
and maintain sustainability? In order to do so, defense companies attempt to achieve an 
appropriate balance between autonomy/independence and influence in the face of 
government policies. 
Keith Klause, Andrew Ross, and Richard Bitzinger, experts on the defense industry, 
have grouped countries with defense equipment manufacturers into three major categories 
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they call the hierarchical defense industry (Bitzinger, 2009). The three categories are: 
critical innovators, adapters and modifiers, and copiers and reproducers. These groupings 
are based on the ability of the defense industry to maintain its productivity continuously as 
a result of a successfully implemented strategic plan. The less the defense industry is 
government-subsidized, the less protection it receives from the government and the more 
autonomy/independence it has in implementing a strategic plan, the more likely the defense 
industry will be sustainable and ready to compete globally. At the lowest level, countries 
may assist in meeting the basic needs for defense with high government involvement in 
financing and protection policies. At the highest level, the defense industry can fulfill all 
the country’s defense article needs and compete globally in the open market with minimal 
government involvement (Bitzinger, 2009). 
Changes in the global situation have been pushing the defense industry to adjust its 
concentration and structure and implement new corporate strategies. This adjustment 
started in the Cold War era and continued into the post–Cold War era. Many countries 
struggle to make their defense industries sustainable. Defense industries have had to 
radically adjust their approaches following dramatic shifts in global demand. For example, 
in the early 1990s, when the Cold War ended, many countries in the world reduced their 
military budgets. Conversely, the 9/11 attacks in 2001 made countries more concerned 
about their defense against terrorism. Since 2001 the U.S increased their defense budget 
by 59%,  and U.S spending on procurement  and R&D more than doubled in fiscal year 
2000 through fiscal year 2008 The U.S. campaign against terrorism, accompanied by many 
NATO countries joining the effort through first-ever invocation of NATO Treaty Article 
V, had a tremendous effect on raising military budgets all over the world (Bitzinger, 2009). 
In contrast, the global economic crisis in 2008 pushed countries to reduce military budgets. 
In 2013, another big change in the defense industry occurred as shown by the number of 
top 100 defense industrial companies around the world reported by SIPRI, as seen in Table 
2 and Figure 1. 
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Table 2.   The Numbers of Arms-Producing Companies by Country and 
Total Sales in 2002, 2003, and 2013 (current U.S. dollars in millions; 
after SIPRI, 2014)  
Country/ 
Region 













USA 47 $623,680 47 $468,908 43 $814,809 
Western 
Europe 37 $725,386 37 $353,025 33 $404,233 
United 
Kingdom 12 $303,314 12 $50,251 9 $85,569 
France 9 $37,352 10 $37,640 10 $78,213 
Trans-
European 2 $29,822 2 $36,719 4 $124,147 
Italy 5 $170,544 4 $14,766 6 $38,847 
Germany 9 $184,354 9 $213,649 4 $77,457 
Other 
Europe 5 $5,485 7 $75,068 6 $11,445 
Russia 4 $2,407 6 $4,617 14 $48,251 
Japan 6 $234,981 5 $110,388 4 $121,232 
Israel 5 $105,258 4 $4,110 3 $8,565 
India 3 $47,772 3 $58,352 3 $5,554 
Canada 2 $720 1 $780 1 $2,053 
Others 5 $4,180 6 $5,364 11 $33,202 
South Korea 2 $1,908 2 $2,126 5 $16,594 
Singapore 1 $1,463 1 $1,618 1 $5,302 
Turkey 0 $0 0 $0 1 $1,140 
Australia 1 $394 2 $1,033 2 $1,970 
Ukraine 0 $0 0 $0 1 $1,871 
South Africa 1 $415 1 $587 0 $0 
Brazil 0 $0 0 $0 1 $6,325 




Figure 1.  Graphic Number of Arms-Producing Companies by Country and 
Total Sales in 2002, 2003, and 2013  
Table 2 and Figure 1 show that the United States and Western European countries 
are still leaders in the business of defense and have proven that certain strategies, 
successfully implemented, can sustain their defense industries. The United States and 
Western Europe have proven that they are in the first tier of the defense industry hierarchy. 
Achieving this involves many factors, including political, environmental, and economic 
factors, both domestic and global. They have succeeded in maintaining the highest levels 
of sustainability in their defense industries.  
Other countries may not be leaders like the United States and Western Europe in 
this hierarchy, but they have made tremendous efforts. This effort has paid off, because 
while at first these countries were not able to produce their own defense articles, they 
slowly climbed from the lowest level of sustainability to the next level, thereby achieving 
their position in the top 100 defense industries list. Examples of these countries include 
South Korea, Turkey, and Ukraine. Government involvement is a big factor in their success 
stories because the defense industry played a significant role in national security and 
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sovereignty. Governments develop policies to sustain their defense industries; therefore, 
this project analyzes various policies governments have undertaken, as well as the costs 
and benefits of those policies.  
D. SUMMARY 
Situational (budget and threat environment) changes that defense industries 
experienced during the Cold War era, and today in the post–Cold War era have forced 
defense industries to adjust their focus of production, their company structure, and their 
company business strategy in order to survive and remain sustainable businesses. Changes 
in the political situation, such as war beginning or ending or any tension between countries, 
influence the defense industry as well as the domestic situation, such as the defense budget, 
which fluctuates depending on economic growth and a country’s priorities. The global 
economy has also brought about significant opportunities and challenges and changed the 
way defense industries run their businesses. 
Dynamic change needs to be made wisely by the defense industry, and government 
policies are one of those changes. To help the defense industry survive, governments 
establish policies that can either support their defense industry or that can become barriers 
for improvement. Several countries have proven their ability to adapt to these changes and 
have become leaders in the global defense industry. Other countries have been able to 
preserve their defense industries, but not at the top of the defense industry hierarchy. 
Therefore, it is useful to further identify and analyze constructive and destructive policies: 
Which tend to support and benefit industry, and which tend to undermine defense industry 
development? What are the costs of such policies, and what are the benefits? 
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III. A REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
A policy approach involves a comprehensive set of policy instruments unified by 
an underlying principle. This research addresses the principle of industrial policy. Different 
organizations and experts have different views and interpretations of industrial policy. For 
example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines 
industrial policy as a “concerted, focused, conscious effort on the part of government to 
encourage and promote a specific industry or sector with an array of policy tools” (Donor 
Committee for Enterprise Development’s (DCED’s) Private Sector Development Synthesis 
Note: Industrial Policy, DCED, 2014, p. 1). The World Bank considers industrial policy to 
be “government efforts to alter industrial structure to promote productivity-based growth” 
(Bora, Lloyd, & Pangestu, 1999). Generally, it can be stated that industrial policy involves 
government action in an attempt to promote and encourage its industries. 
Industrial policy can appear in many forms. This ranges from encouraging 
competition, to tariff and trade policy (protection), to tax relief, to subsidies of various 
forms, to export processing zones, to state ownership of industry (Robinson, 2009). 
Countries adopt many different approaches to industrial policy.  
A. GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY  
The primary objective of a nation’s defense spending is to provide its military 
forces, in a timely and economical way, with equipment and services of a quality and 
quantity that are sufficient for them to undertake the roles assigned to them by the 
government (Kane, 2009). This statement can be broken down into several explanations of 
the reasons for military combat equipment purchases. 
(1) To Improve Military Power 
Success in war is closely correlated with the training of military personnel and the 
quality of their equipment. The quantity and quality of military equipment greatly affects 
the calculation of combat strength. In a lesson learned from World War II, Churchill 
emphasized that, despite a clearly stated policy to maintain air superiority over any 
threatening European power, the British government failed to resource that policy in the 
 24 
face of rapidly increasing German aircraft production (Dunn, 2014). Sophisticated military 
equipment is not an absolute guarantee of victory in battle because it all depends on the 
man behind the gun and the operational theatre. The Vietnam War provides an example 
where combat forces equipped with sophisticated weapons still found it difficult to defeat 
North Vietnamese forces partly due to a lack of understanding of the theatre of conflict 
(Hamilton, n.d.). 
(2) To Maintain a Country’s Sovereignty 
The primary duty of military forces is to preserve their country’s sovereignty. This 
includes defending the country from aggression and potential occupation by other countries 
(Edelstein, 2004). With improvements in the technology and sophistication of armaments, 
the threat environment requires new investments. For example, today the threat 
environment is not only physical, but also cyber, and quality improvements in armaments 
now mean that precise “intelligent” munitions can replace multiple “dumb” bombs from 
the past.  
Military forces need defense articles that are specifically designed to engage in the 
type of conflict they may encounter (Dunn, 2014). For example, countries that have a vast 
sea area require warships to patrol their waters, and not only standard patrol ships, but other 
types of warships as well, such as destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, to support a strategy 
to maintain military power balance in a regional area. In addition, fighter aircraft are needed 
to intercept intruders that might enter the airspace of a country without permission, or to 
maintain a policy of air superiority. 
(3) To Prepare for War 
Nobody knows when or where the next conflict will take place. After the Cold War 
ended with the breakup of the Soviet Union, it seemed there would no longer be a threat of 
war in the world. Many countries were optimistic about a lasting peace. So who would 
have predicted that Iraq would suddenly invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990? This attack 
ultimately triggered the first Gulf War (Persian Gulf War, n.d.). Today the world is riveted 
by the chaos that began in Syria in 2011 (Syrian Civil War, n.d.). As with Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait, this event happened without prior prediction. 
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These two examples of unexpected wars provide evidence that peace can turn into 
war at any moment. There is no guarantee peace will last forever. Conflicts that were 
initially modest and local might spread and turn into wars that threaten a country’s 
sovereignty (Edelstein, 2004). Therefore, military forces in every country attempt to 
prepare themselves against any unwanted conflicts that may happen unexpectedly. Thus, 
military forces should have the capability to deter conflict and defend the country (Biddle, 
2010).  
(4) To Participate in International Strategic Issues 
Participating in international strategic issues is one way to demonstrate countries’ 
interest and credibility on the world stage. Examples include participation in the United 
Nations program for maintaining world peace by sending troops as members of 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement forces, and carrying out joint exercises to strengthen 
cooperation between countries. 
In addition to understanding the reasons for maintaining military forces, it is also 
imperative to understand how countries decide to supply their forces. In order to acquire 
military equipment, governments have two choices: To make their own military equipment 
through a government organization or state-owned company, or to buy equipment from 
private firms. Because of high costs and high capital investments only a few countries are 
currently implementing policies to build their own military equipment. In addition, limited 
expertise of human resources provides another barrier. Most governments purchase 
equipment from either domestic firms or foreign firms and may use offset agreements to 
require domestic co-production or licensed domestic production when purchasing from 
foreign companies (Ianakiev & Mladenov, 2009). 
Many countries attempt to shape the capacity of their domestic defense industries. 




(1) Supplying and Equipping Forces  
Military forces require suitable combat-ready equipment. This requirement does 
not end with governments’ purchase of that equipment. The availability of spare parts is 
critical to support operations and maintenance. The existence of a domestic defense 
industry with the capability of manufacturing both combat equipment and spare parts can 
provide valuable support for combat readiness (Sandler & Hartley, 1995). 
(2) Defense Capability 
Well-developed defense industries that produce sophisticated arms can provide a 
decisive advantage over an enemy. In 2013, the SIPRI stated that there were 43 arms-
producing companies in the United States, which provided the U.S. superior combat 
capability (SIPRI, 2014). 
(3) Strategic Influence 
Having a world-class defense industry can give a country greater political and 
military influence, larger stature in alliances, and greater opportunity to enter collaborative 
programs and markets. When people hear about a world-class defense industry, what 
comes to mind is the mastery of sophisticated, high-technology equipment. Part of the 
strategic value of a country’s defense industry is the deterrence effect it provides. Potential 
aggressors may be more likely to reconsider engaging in disputes. Political and military 
influence increases when a country’s industry masters advanced technology allowing 
companies to enter and compete in the global marketplace. In addition, an advanced 
defense industry can attract foreign companies and foreign investment. (Kane, 2009). 
(4) Independence of Military Equipment Support 
Domestic production of military equipment reduces a country’s dependency on 
other countries (Sandler & Hartley, 1995). Dependence on an exporter country for military 
equipment can undermine military capability of the importer country if an exporter country 
applies embargoes on critical armaments or materiel. The importer country’s force might 
find itself with limited availability of spare parts. When the spare parts inventory runs out, 
operational readiness collapses. 
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Another risk that endangers operational availability is bankruptcy. When the 
original manufacturer experiences bankruptcy or stops production and can no longer supply 
necessary equipment or supplies, the operational readiness of the importer country will 
suffer once the spare parts run out. 
The risks of dependency can be minimized if a country’s domestic defense industry 
is capable of providing equipment, supplies and other support. However, the cost of this 
insurance is often substantial. For example, Indonesia tried to support its military aircraft 
by producing CN-235 as a joint production agreement between its state-owned companies 
(Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara [IPTN]) with Casa Spain. But the cost to build each 
CN-235 turned out to be significantly more expensive than to build a C-295, an equivalent 
aircraft made by the foreign company, Casa. The CN-235 costs USD $34 million (Deagal, 
2015b), while the C-295 costs only USD $22 million, an $11million insurance premium 
per aircraft (Deagal, 2015a). 
(5) Competition in the Global Marketplace 
One objective of a country’s defense industry is to supply the needs of its military 
(Sandler & Hartley, 1995); however, in some cases, companies in that industry are capable 
of becoming global sellers of military equipment. The country carries out military 
equipment procurement up to a certain quantity, and may decide not to continue purchasing 
the equipment by the time the contract is completed. In this case, the manufacturer may 
have an opportunity to sell its military equipment to other countries. The industry might 
seize the opportunity to sell to foreign buyers to maintain its revenues and pay the salaries 
of its employees. If the company’s military equipment is accepted in the global marketplace 
and purchased in significant quantities, the company can take advantage of economies of 
scale and learning curves to lower costs and boost profits. 
B. GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL POLICIES FOR THE DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY 
The main goals of defense industrial policies generally are to develop domestic 
production capabilities while also building industrial infrastructures and generating 
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employment in the home country. Ideally, a successful industrial policy ensures that 
industry does not rely solely on domestic government purchases. 
Industrial policies in the private sector are not new. For example, most governments 
grant investment subsidies and special tax credits to foster employment and increase 
productive investment, particularly in struggling business areas. But the consents among 
economists is that defense industrial policy is a mistake if government programs simply 
finance activities that firms would have undertaken anyway in the absence of the industrial 
policy. Taxpayer money would simply be wasted (Chriscuolo, Martin, Overman, & 
Reenon, 2012). 
Government policies in supporting the defense industry can take many forms and 
can differ greatly among countries. A government may facilitate information 
dissemination, coordination, and the development and retention of technical skills. 
Governments can promote specific firms internationally, or simply provide a forum where 
small firms (sub-contractors) can coordinate with prime contractors. Many governments 
provide special assistance to their small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that would 
normally find it difficult to participate in global supply chains. Governments can also use 
targeted procurement to support export development. Boosting the scale of production of 
a domestic firm, and thus lowering its average costs, may help firms achieve economies of 
scale that allows them to become internationally competitive. 
Every country has a different approach to its defense industrial policy. Berkok et 
al. (2012) discusses six general focus areas that multiple countries use to shape their 
industrial policies. These areas are: 1) policies that improve coordination between 
government and the defense industry, 2) policies that encourage and support research, 3) 
policies targeted to support small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 4) policies that help 
firms access global supply chains, 5) policies that create a pro-competitive environment, 
and 6) offset policies. A discussion of each appears below:  
1. Policies That Improve Coordination between Government and the 
Defense Industry 
Coordination between the government and the defense industry is very important. 
The market for specialized military equipment is different from the market for other goods 
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because of their highly differentiated nature and basic function, which means they are not 
easily available (Berkok et al., 2012). Therefore, governments can encounter obstacles in 
procuring specialized military equipment. These obstacles can lead to serious budget 
problems because of high prices, lengthy delivery dates, and difficulties in companies 
complying with specifications. 
The defense industry has problems maintaining its sustainability when sporadic 
orders and unique requirements, make it difficult for companies to manage resources such 
as capital, and labor (Berkok et al., 2012). Although the defense industry’s problems cannot 
be totally eliminated, they can be reduced by increasing coordination between the 
government and industry. Coordination between the government and industry might 
include military equipment maintenance projects to sustain industry when there is a 
slowdown in new production contracts. Some governments choose an import substitution 
policy that favors domestic production to prioritize purchases from domestic firms. As a 
result, the company is sheltered from foreign competition and government orders are 
guaranteed to flow to protected companies (Berkok et al., 2012).  
However, the government has to be cautious in imposing an import substitution 
policy. Lack of competition will result in governments paying higher prices for fewer, and 
lower quality, products and services. This policy is supposed to be temporary, allowing 
time for the defense industry to invest in new plant and equipment, train its employees, and 
increase productivity to compete with foreign defense industries. In the meantime, there is 
a risk the domestic industry may fall behind since foreign companies are a valuable source 
of learning and knowledge (Bruton, 1989). Applying an import substitution policy across 
too long a period of time would undermine the benefits of competition, and ultimately lead 
to monopoly power. Worse yet, it risks government capture, where a company decides to 
invest in politicians (legal lobbying or corruption) to preserve its market power, instead of 
investing in its plant, equipment and people to compete successfully in global markets.  
2. Policies That Encourage and Support Research 
The importance of military force superiority motivates all countries to create the 
best possible combat technology. Therefore, military technology evolves and changes 
quickly. Countries that invest bigger budgets for the development of the latest technologies 
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tend to lead this competition. The company that has a lead in technology development can 
more easily penetrate the global marketplace (Bitzinger, 2009). 
Figure 2 illustrates defense R&D spending by tier I and II countries, excluding 
Russia. The United States, as the biggest exporter of arms, spends the most on R&D and 
dominates global sales. In 2013, the U.S. spending on R&D in defense sector was 53 % of 
global R&D spending (OECD, 2015) The UK and France, although spending less on R&D 
than the United States, also invests significant sums to sustain their arms exports. By 
allocating substantial funds for R&D, these countries can be categorized as critical 
innovator countries that are on the frontiers of defense technology and deliver cutting-edge 
technology, thus making them dominant arms suppliers. 
 
Figure 2.   Defense Budget Research and Development Graph as a Percentage 
of Total Government Budget Appropriation or Outlays for Research 
and Development (GBAORD; from Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development [OECD], 2015) 
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Technology developed in the military field is sometimes also useful in other fields. 
The development of state-of-the-art technology can yield large orders and earn a place for 
companies in global supply chains. 
Investment in state-of-the-art technologies can also be facilitated by an import 
substitution policy which allows the domestic industry to invest in R&D to compete 
globally. Investments in R&D can serve as an export promotion tool when the industry 
develops competitive products (Bruton, 1989). But this import substitution policy is also 
subject to all of the same risks discussed earlier.  
3. Policies Targeted to Support Enterprises with a Global Comparative 
Advantage  
Many countries recognize that mastering all technological capabilities is no longer 
possible. R&D around the world quickly improves upon new technologies and makes 
previous technologies obsolete. Thus, investing in all areas of technology would cost too 
much and be inefficient (Kapstein, 2009). 
Countries have limited their defense investments, making educated guesses about 
areas of excellence that might improve their comparative advantage. Those countries often 
encourage (through subsidies, tax credits, or other policies) domestic defense firms to 
preserve and promote technological competencies by investing more in R&D. The goal of 
these policies is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of domestic defense products 
making them more competitive, and capable of sustaining a position in global markets 
(Berkok et al., 2012). 
4. Policies That Help Firms Access Global Supply Chains 
Along with the end of the Cold War, cuts in military budgets in many countries 
have triggered a reshaping of the defense industry. There are now only a few companies 
that can be categorized as prime contractors. According to SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing 
companies, there were 53 companies that categorized as prime contractors in 1990. This 
number then decreased to only 25 companies that still existed and could be considered as 
prime contractors in 2003 (Dunne, 2009). Financial and political power makes it possible 
for these prime companies to restrict new entrants into the defense sector. Small companies 
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that lack resources and marketing capabilities compared to larger companies find it difficult 
to become global suppliers. But large companies may also find it difficult to sell their 
products internationally without support from their governments, if foreign suppliers are 
supported by their own governments (Berkok et al., 2012). 
Some countries, like Australia, the Netherlands, and Turkey, have realized that their 
defense industries can be successful only if their defense companies are part of an 
international supply chain network (Kane, 2009). Although many countries recognize that 
achieving and sustaining positions in the defense market, including the international 
market, is primarily the industry’s own responsibility, they believe government has an 
important role to play. 
5. Policies That Create a Pro-Competitive Environment 
The defense industry is the same as other sectors in that it needs a stable and 
predictable environment to encourage companies to invest. This includes a stable political 
environment, favorable economic conditions, secure property rights, and rule of law. 
Regulatory policy must also support investment, avoiding complex, and burdensome 
regulations (Revia, 2014). Barriers to entry must be also be low to reap the benefits of 
competition (Robinson, 2009). 
Defense industries are often very technical, and as such, require a technically 
skilled labor force. A country that wishes to develop a domestic defense industry must be 
willing to invest in an educated workforce (Berkok et al., 2012). 
6. Offset Policies 
Offsets are “in-kind benefits” (e.g., goods or services) provided by a supplier to a 
purchasing country that offset the purchase price of the article by the foreign country 
(Nackman, 2011). The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL; 1993) guide categorizes offsets as a variety of countertrades. The 
UNCITRAL (1993) defines countertrade as “transactions in which one party supplies 
goods, services, technology or other economic value to the second party, and in return, the 
first party purchases from the second party an agreed amount of goods, services, 
technology or other economic value” (p. 5). Based on the UNCITRAL guide, offsets 
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normally involve the supply of goods of high value or technological sophistication and may 
include the transfer of technology and know-how, promotion of investments, or facilitation 
of access to a particular market.  
There is no international standard for how offsets should work or are applied in 
particular procurements. Over 130 countries engage in the practice in one form or another. 
Each country gives offsets a different label, but the concept is widespread. In the defense 
arena, many countries apply offsets in order to counterbalance the loss of domestic and 
economic activity, or domestic capability, by ensuring some form of preservation of 
domestic capability or return investment in exchange for granting a foreign company 
exclusive rights to be a defense supplier or contractor in the applicable country (Nackman, 
2011).  
In practice, offsets are often complicated. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
generally forbids the use of offsets in government procurement under Article 16 of the 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Michael Czinkota and Anne Talbot argued 
that countertrade, of which offsets are a subdivision or, sometimes, an equivalent concept, 
contradicts the spirit of some of the most fundamental principles of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO system: transparency, consultation, multilateralism, 
compensation, and “the aim to reduce trade distortions” (as cited in Ianakiev & Mladenov, 
2009, p. 190). But exceptions are granted in Article 23 on account of reasons pertaining to 
national security and public health (Magahy, Cunha, & Pyman, 2010). 
Offsets are commonly categorized as direct or indirect, as seen in Figure 3, 
depending on whether offset requirements tie directly or indirectly to the article being 
purchased. 
In the case of defense purchases, direct offsets relate directly to the defense 
equipment or services being acquired. The goal of direct offsets is often strategic 
independence, such as developing related maintenance and upgrade capabilities. Indirect 
offsets are not linked to the acquired defense products or services. Many countries use 
indirect offsets as a tool for providing development opportunities in sectors other than 
defense (education, health care, etc.) to make defense purchases more politically attractive 
(Brauer & Dunne, 2004). 
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Figure 3.  Classification of Offset Transaction Categories (Source: BIS, as 
cited in Nackman, 2011, p. 519) 
There are many reasons why countries require offsets in major defense 
procurements. Nackman (2011) lists some of these reasons: 
• to reduce the impact on the economy from losing major defense programs 
to foreign contractors; 
• to access defense technology know-how; 
• to build a domestic defense industrial base capability; and 
• to preserve or improve domestic employment (p. 520). 
Not all countries agree to use offsets because there is a widespread negative 
preconception of offsets, including arguments that they are prime instruments for 
corruption (Magahy et al., 2010). . The United States officially stated that offsets are 
economically inefficient and trade distorting (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Industry and Security, 2007). Offsets are considered inefficient because the benefits of 
offsets are paid for in higher prices for defense equipment (Ianakiev & Mladenov, 2009). 
For example, Ianakev and Mladenov (2009) explain that the desire to obtain the contract 




This chapter provided a general overview of the costs and benefits of government 
industrial policy, focusing on the defense industry. Governments establish industrial 
policies in an effort to promote and encourage its industries. There are a variety of 
government industrial policies, such as tariff protection and trade policy (e.g., import 
substitution), tax relief, subsidies of various forms, export processing zones, and state 
ownership of industry. 
A sustainable defense industry can allow a country not to become too dependent on 
foreign military products. A sustainable, efficient and effective defense industry can also 
have strategic influence that grants a country greater political and military standing. 
Industrial policies designed to facilitate the creation of sustainable defense industries also 
contain serious risks. These include the creation of monopoly power, corruption, and 
government capture by favored domestic firms. 
Every country takes different approaches in their defense industrial policy. This 
research covered six general policy areas that multiple countries use to develop their 
defense policy. These areas are policies that improve coordination between government 
and the defense industry, policies that encourage and support research, policies targeted to 
support SMEs, policies that help firms access global supply chains, policies that create a 
pro-competitive environment, and offset policies. 
The next chapter explores government defense industrial policies in tier I, tier II, 
and tier III countries. The explanation of government policies in Chapter IV is based on six 
general policies described by Berkok (2012). There are slight differences in policies 
targeted to support SMEs, which are converted into policies targeted to support enterprises 
to develop a global comparative advantage. The next chapter also discusses costs and 
benefits from implementation of these policies. 
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IV. EXISTING POLICIES AND THEIR COSTS AND BENEFITS 
IN COUNTRIES WITH A SUSTAINABLE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
The end of the Cold War had a great effect around the world. Countries began 
reducing their spending on arms articles, resulting in smaller orders and fewer new projects. 
Thus, there were job losses, manufacturing plant closures, and mergers or exits from the 
defense business. Mergers created new companies, such as the Boeing Group (formed from 
the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas and the later acquisition of Rockwell) with 
the purpose of obtaining economies of scale (Hartley, 1997). Companies had to adjust to 
uncertainties in the defense industry in order to survive. They were required to invest in 
innovative R&D. 
Governments learn from experience and therefore apply policies to support and 
improve their defense industries. This chapter presents policies in four countries that were 
chosen to represent each tier in the defense industry classification. Tier I is represented by 
the United States as the “critical innovator” country in weapons production, tier II is 
represented by the UK and France as “modifiers and adapters” in the defense industry, and 
tier III is represented by South Korea as an example of a “copier and reproducer” country. 
South Korea is the best example of a country that struggled and eventually succeeded in 
upgrading its classification from tier III to tier II, its current classification. These countries 
are analyzed on the basis of policies they have adopted from the six general policies 
described by Berkok (2012), as explained in Chapter III. 
Implementation of any of the six policies common in the defense industry involves 
costs and benefits which are described in this chapter. Costs and benefits for each policy 
should be evaluated and compared among the six common policies in order to guide future 
policy or improve existing policy. There is no worst or best policy; rather, consideration is 
given to how to identify and recommend a policy that is suitable to the situation and needs 
of a country, since each country is unique. 
A. THE EXISTING POLICIES 
The four countries (the United States, the UK, France, and South Korea) are good 
representatives of each tier in the defense industry country classification as demonstrated 
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by sales revenues earned over several years. Table 3 provides an overview of the world’s 
top 100 arms-producing companies located in the United States, the UK, France, and South 
Korea and their annual sales. Figure 4 details the sales made by the top 100 arms-producing 
companies that reside in the United States, the UK, France, and South Korea, and Figure 5 
includes the number of top 100 companies in each of these countries. 
Table 3.   Number of World Top 100 Arms-Producing Companies in the 
United States, UK, France, and South Korea, and Their Sales (after 
SIPRI, 2014) 
Year 

























2003 47 468,908 12 50,251 10 37,640 2 2,126 
2004 50 185,950 12 33,690 9 23,080 2 970 
2005 48 194,730 13 38,320 11 28,080 3 1,540 
2006 48 222,290 13 41,130 9 25,610 4 2,120 
2007 50 236,980 10 45,600 9 29,930 3 2,110 
2008 49 261,600 12 50,850 10 31,150 2 1,520 
2009 47 274,700 12 50,880 10 33,320 2 1,680 
2010 47 277,940 10 49,890 10 34,100 4 3,840 
2011 45 268,600 15 55,500 9 31,180 5 5,160 
2012 41 252,280 14 50,600 10 30,910 4 3,790 




Figure 4.  Sales Made by the United States, UK, France, and South Korea 
between 2003 and 2013 (after SIPRI, 2014) 
 
Figure 5.  Number of Top 100 Arms Producing Companies in the United 
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Each country takes different approaches in implementing the six general policies in 
the defense industry. They adjust these policies so that they are suitable to their needs and 
support the achievement of their goals. The United States, a tier I country, maintains its 
dominance by leading in innovation. The UK, France, and South Korea try to upgrade their 
industries to preserve or enhance their market position. It is useful to analyze and collect 
information on lessons learned from implementing policies that have led to improvements 
in tier status. 
1. Tier I: The United States 
The United States is the world’s number one and largest military exporter. In 2013, 
sales from its defense industry were USD $85,569 million (SIPRI, 2014). Figure 6 shows 
sales of U.S. companies listed in the world’s top 100 arms-producing companies based on 
information from the SIPRI.  
 
Figure 6.  Number of Companies in the United States and Their Sales (after 
SIPRI, 2014) 
The U.S. defense industry is no different from many industries that apply free-
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products that reflect consumers’ tastes and preferences, and prices that reflect the marginal 
costs of production which tend to be driven down over time in the search for efficiency. 
The U.S. defense industrial strategy mostly relies on market forces and intervenes in the 
marketplace only when absolutely necessary to create and sustain competition, innovation, 
and essential industrial capabilities. Limiting competition is the fact participants are only 
domestic firms, along with selected firms of U.S.-allied countries that have a reciprocal 
relationship with the United States. U.S. defense industrial policy tends to gravitate toward 
an analysis of how to maintain capabilities and competition in areas within this defense-
unique industrial base (Greenwalt, 2014). 
 As the principal customer, the Department of Defense (DOD) influences the shape 
of the defense industry through its research, budgets, evaluation criteria, and logistics 
process. But the U.S. policy for self-sufficiency in meeting its defense need sometimes has 
led to costly and inefficient defense-unique acquisitions and business processes 
(Greenwalt, 2014). The joint strike fighter program is one example of such an acquisition. 
In 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2012) stated that the project was 
six years behind schedule, and unit costs per aircraft had doubled since the start of 
development in 2001.  
The department’s challenge is to establish, maintain, and strengthen industrial 
relationships that ensure that the defense industrial base is both healthy and capable (DOD, 
2015). In so doing, the department must also balance the need to encourage competitive 
forces to control costs and spur innovation with the desire that companies combine with 
other firms to realize efficiencies, create integrated and more capable industrial 
capabilities, or eliminate excess capacity. The department’s policy is explained below. 
(1) Improve Coordination between Government and the Defense Industry 
Although the defense industry relies on free-market competition, politics plays a 
much larger role in the defense industry than it does in the market for commercial products 
(Eland, 2001). Thus, the DOD established the Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base 
Policy (MIBP) to ensure robust, secure, resilient, and innovative industrial capabilities that 
can fulfill warfighter requirements (DOD, 2015).  
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The MIBP supports the Office of the Secretary of Defense and service acquisition 
executives by providing detailed analyses and in-depth understanding of the increasingly 
global, commercial, and financially complex industrial supply chain essential to national 
defense. It also recommends or takes appropriate actions to maintain the health, integrity, 
and technical superiority of that supply chain (DOD, 2015). The MIBP is the DOD’s lead 
in all matters relating to mergers, acquisitions, and dissolutions of national security-related 
business. 
(2) Policies That Encourage and Support Research 
The MIBP has the Defense Innovation Marketplace program to 
consolidate resources for both industry and the DOD regarding the department’s 
R&D/science and technology investment priorities, business opportunities, and 
engagement activities (DOD, 2015). The program provides a centralized resource for the 
department’s acquisition, science, and technology professionals on information about the 
industry’s independent R&D activities. The program serves as a secure portal for the 
industry to share its independent R&D (IR&D) projects with the DOD, thus providing 
visibility into these industry efforts.  
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 31.205-18 regulates independent research 
and development (IR&D) and bid and proposal costs. IR&D is a source of potential 
solutions for the technology challenges of the DOD. Firms interested in the program have 
a right to decide which technologies to pursue, as long as these efforts are of potential 
interest to the DOD. IR&D is not federally funded; thus, technical data rights remain with 
the firm (FAR 31.205). 
In supporting small business, DOD established small business innovation research 
(SBIR) and small business technology transfer (STTR). SBIR program was established by 
congress in 1982 to fund R&D by U.S. owned and operated business of less than 500 
employees. The DOD accounts for more than half of federal governments’ total SBIR 
program (SBIR, 2015) 
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(3) Policies Targeted to Support Enterprises With Global Comparative 
Advantage 
The United States is well known as home to a lot of companies with global 
competitive advantages. Examples include companies such as Boeing and Lockheed 
Martin located in the United States. Basically, with their cutting-edge technology, these 
companies are able to compete globally with minimal intervention from the government. 
Also, the U.S. policy for self-sufficiency in meeting its defense needs supports the 
companies’ survival. (Guay, 2007). 
Unfortunately, not all firms in the defense industry survive. Reduction of defense 
budgets after the Cold War resulted in declining orders and R&D support. Thus, some firms 
did not survive and the others’ capabilities declined. The DOD (2014) has the authority to 
assess industrial base capabilities to identify endangered industrial capabilities. The 
instruction also regulates the criteria for the assessment of endangered industrial 
capabilities, the means for safeguarding sensitive information, and the procedures for 
preserving capabilities at the program level and below. The purpose of the assessment is to 
ensure that the industrial capabilities needed to meet current and future national security 
requirements are available and affordable (DOD, 2014). 
(4) Policies That Help Firms Access Global Supply Chains 
The U.S. companies in the defense industry are globally competitive because of 
their quality and high technology products. However, the DOD has also established 
arrangements with several nations to ensure the mutual supply of defense goods and 
services. These bilateral arrangements allow the DOD to request priority delivery for DOD 
contracts, subcontracts, or orders from companies in these countries. Similarly, these 
arrangements allow the signatory nations to request priority delivery for their contracts and 
orders with U.S. firms (DOD, 2015). The United States has established such security of 
supply arrangements with seven countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK.  
(5) Policies That Create a Pro-Competitive Environment 
Where technological superiority on the battlefield provides a critical military 
advantage, competition can stimulate valuable innovation. Competition designed by the 
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DOD pushed General Electric and Pratt & Whitney to maximize their efforts to provide 
the best propulsion engine for the F-16. Based on the limited numbers of suppliers for many 
defense products and services, the DOD has the challenge to foster a suitable framework 
for competition in defense markets. The DOD believes that the competitive pressure of the 
marketplace is the best way to shape an industrial environment that supports the defense 
strategy. Therefore, the DOD intervenes in the marketplace only when necessary to 
maintain appropriate competition. The DOD also intervenes when it needs to develop and 
preserve industrial and technological capabilities essential to defense (DOD, 2012). 
Sustaining a competitive environment is not easy and poses special challenges. As 
the defense industry evolves, the DOD has been trying to sustain effective competition 
balancing several factors:  
• The need to sustain multiple competitors for legacy industrial capabilities is 
significantly different than the need to develop and maintain potential 
competitors able to develop product lines requiring high levels of 
innovation.  
• Vertical integration and the resulting influence on companies’ make/buy 
decisions, or decisions to no longer act as a merchant supplier to other firms, 
could impact the DOD’s ability to acquire the best mix of capabilities from 
industry.  
• As a consequence of worldwide defense industry consolidation and 
collaboration, the DOD must determine the effects of competition from 
non-U.S. defense firms on the anti-competitive risks associated with U.S. 
defense firm combinations.  
• The DOD must also assess whether foreign firm acquisitions of U.S. 
defense firms will likely result in the transfer of critical technologies from 
the U.S. industrial landscape or present risks to supply chain reliability and 
integrity (DOD, 2012). 
(6) Offset Policies 
Unlike other nations, the U.S. government does not apply an offset policy in 
awarding foreign contractors domestic defense contracts, although it often applies goals 
for subcontracting to U.S. small businesses and a price evaluation preference under the 
Buy American Act (Nackman, 2011). The government views the practice of offsets as 
causing economic distortions in international defense trade and undermining fairness and 
competitiveness (Kane, 2009). However, a different approach occurs when U.S. firms 
agree to use offsets when they are awarded contracts from foreign countries. According to 
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the report Offsets in Defense Trade, Nineteenth Study, over the 20 year period from 1993 
to 2013, 62 U.S. firms reported having signed 13,377 offset-related defense export sales 
contracts with a total value of $66.7 billion with 46 countries and two multi-country 
arrangements (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, 2015). 
The total offset credit value was $79.4 billion. 
2. Tier II: United Kingdom and France 
The next two sections provide an overview of the UK and France, which are both 
tier II countries. 
a. United Kingdom 
The UK is one of the world’s largest military exporters. In 2013, revenues earned 
from the defense industry were USD $85,569 million (SIPRI, 2014). Figure 7 shows sales 
revenues made by UK companies listed in the world’s top 100 arms-producing companies 
according to the SIPRI. 
 
Figure 7.  Number of Companies in the UK and Their Sales (after SIPRI, 2014) 
The UK government established the current policy for its defense industries based 
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• Defense Industrial Policy (DIP). The DIP was released in 2002 as a joint 
product of the Minister of State for Defense Procurement and the Minister 
of State for Employment Relations, Industry, and the Regions. The DIP 
explicitly recognizes a thriving, innovative, and competitive defense 
industry as being essential for the country’s defense. The document stated 
that the policy’s objective is to enhance the competitiveness and 
sustainability of the UK defense industry while continuing to provide high 
quality equipment for its armed forces at best value for money (Kane, 2009; 
Ministry of Defence UK, 2002). 
• Defense Industrial Strategy (DIS). The DIS was released in 2005 by the 
Defense Secretary, Trade and Industry Secretary, Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury, Minister of Defense Procurement, and Minister of State for 
Industry and the Regions. The DIS is an implementation guide for DIP 
(2002), and is driven by the need to provide the UK’s armed forces with the 
equipment they require, on time, and at best value for the taxpayer. The DIS 
gives a strategic view of future defense capability requirements and further 
details the principles and processes that underpin procurement and 
industrial decisions (Ministry of Defence UK, 2005). 
• Defense Technology Strategy (DTS). The DTS was issued in 2006 by the 
Minister of Defense Procurement. The DTS provides the clarity and 
direction needed for success by describing the underpinning technologies 
that are important to the defense sector (Ministry of Defence UK, 2006).  
Based on the DIS, the UK retains a sizeable, open, and broadly-based defense 
industry to deliver a large proportion of needs of the Ministry of Defense (MOD). But the 
DIS also stated that the UK continues to welcome overseas investments, especially from 
companies that create value, employment, technology, or intellectual assets in the UK and 
thus become part of the UK defense industry. 
The implementation of the three documents is described as follows: 
(1) Improve Coordination Between Government and the Defense Industry 
The MOD aligns its own and industry’s behaviors and processes in order to ensure 
that the capability requirements of the armed forces can be met now and in the future. 
Armed forces need a continuous supply of equipment with consistent performance, 
especially if they are in conflict situations. Failing to sustain the capability in the UK would 
lead to reliance on a single overseas source and might cause monopolistic issues that could 
bring harm to the UK (Ministry of Defence UK, 2005). 
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(2) Policies That Encourage and Support Research 
The Minister of Defense Procurement issued the DTS in 2006. The DTS sets out 
MOD R&D priorities for providing future military capability. The government realizes that 
investment in defense-related technology is critical to retaining access to cutting-edge 
military capabilities. The budget for investment in R&D is quite large, at approximately 
£2.6 billion (8% of the defense budget) each year (Kane, 2009). This sizable expenditure 
is intended to encourage innovation in order to support the UK defense forces. 
(3) Policies Targeted to Supporting Enterprises with a Global Comparative 
Advantage 
According to the DIS, government also plays a role as a regulator. And as a 
regulator, the government believes it has a significant and direct impact on the business 
environment and plays an important role in maintaining competitiveness in UK markets. 
However, in some cases, government takes special actions to support some domestic 
companies with a global comparative advantage. The companies are very important for the 
government in earning economic benefits and retaining defense capabilities in the UK. For 
example, the government holds special shares in BAE (British Aerospace) Systems and 
Rolls-Royce to protect some of its vital defense industry capabilities (Kane, 2009). 
(4) Policies That Help Firms Access Global Supply Chains 
Whenever possible, the government, as a customer is willing to use open market 
standards. Building standards different from common international standards would make 
it difficult for the UK’s defense industry to sell its products. The government also plans to 
actively support exports and provide fiscal incentives, such as tax breaks for R&D and 
providing a cash sum for some SMEs to encourage innovation. The government offers 
assistance to SMEs, including  loan guarantee for small firms, Manufacturing Advisory 
Service to provide diagnostics and advices for manufacturing excellence,  and support to 
implement best business practices (Ministry of Defence UK, 2005). 
(5) Policies That Create a Pro-Competitive Environment 
The DIS requires the UK government to produce an attractive environment for 
industry by maintaining a stable, macro-economic, and political environment. The 
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government also makes efforts to maintain a highly skilled work force by supporting 
education and basic science. The DIS also mandates that government takes measures to 
help keeping the cost low for setting up and running businesses. 
(6) Offset Policies 
The UK does not have official policy on offset requirement and in big effort to 
create a business environment that encourages foreign contractors to use UK firms as 
subcontractors. This objective is achieved by establishing a stable economic environment 
and investing in science and engineering training (Kane, 2009; Berkok et al., 2012). 
b. France 
France is one of the world’s largest military exporters. In 2013, revenues earned 
from the defense industry were USD $78,213 million (SIPRI, 2014), as shown in Figure 8. 
From a European perspective, France has a powerful defense industry, which for many 
years has been the main supplier to the French armed forces. Among European countries, 
France has most consistently used the power of the state to support selected industries and 
companies, especially those linked to national defense and infrastructure (Owen, 2012).  
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In France, the state has a deep-rooted tradition of defense-industry ownership. 
There are three types of state-owned enterprises: state enterprises that have no juridical 
identity; public enterprises that have juridical identity, follow private law, and the state is 
the only owner; and national enterprises that have juridical identity and the state has direct 
or indirect influence on them (Eliassen, 2002).  
Disarmament following the end of the Cold War resulted in the downsizing of 
defense industries throughout NATO, and the French also suffered from this. After 1991, 
French military outlays were reduced, many markets shrank, and, consequently, there was 
a reduction in the arms industry (Eliassen, 2002). Eliassen (2002) also explained that the 
reduction of national defense budgets, the explosion of R&D expenditures imposed by the 
growing complexity of arms systems, and the competition from American companies 
forced the arms sector to adapt. A policy of privatization, which began in 1986, was one 
option applied by the state. A restructuring program was started in 1996 and was followed 
by a merger of some companies, such as the merger of Dassault and Aerospatiale. 
However, France continued to protect and tolerate inefficient and loss-making nationalized 
defense companies dependent on national orders (Eliassen, 2002). 
The business and government leadership in France realized that R&D carried out 
by itself and other European countries is inefficient. It is difficult to match the benchmark 
that the United States has established with its huge budget and high technology. Therefore, 
the main solution— amid tough current market conditions, exploding R&D costs, and the 
general crisis in the defense sector—was international collaboration between France and 
other countries, mainly EU countries. France strongly supports the development of a 
European defense sector, preferably with itself as the leader (Kane, 2009). 
The French government has integrated defense policy with economic and industrial 
policies, and consistently views its defense industrial base as important for both national 
security and for the country’s overall economic well-being due its close links to strategic 
civil sectors (aerospace, space, telecommunications, and information technology; Kane, 
2009). 
The general French government policy regarding the defense industry includes: 
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(1) Improve Coordination Between Government and the Defense Industry 
France regulates coordination between the government and the defense industry 
without an implicitly stated policy, possibly because the government was instrumental in 
establishing the defense industry. But the thing that should be appreciated is the 
consistency of the government in utilizing domestic production and their efforts to actively 
develop domestic defense industry capability (Eliassen, 2002). 
Procurement of defense arms articles in France is carried out by the General 
Delegation for Armaments (DGA). Kane (2009) explains that one directorate under the 
DGA, the Central Service for Industrial Affairs, is responsible for defense industrial policy 
and oversees the condition and capabilities of the company’s defense industry. The 
directorate is entitled to take actions aimed at improving the competiveness and profits of 
the French defense industry. 
(2) Policies That Encourage and Support Research 
The DGA has responsibility in controlling research and development in French 
armament program (Eliassen, 2002). To focus on the R&D program, the French White 
Paper on Defence and National Security (Minister of Defense of France, 2008) mentioned 
eight industry sectors and technologies that would be a priority until 2025: nuclear systems, 
space systems, naval systems, aeronautics systems, land systems, missile systems, security 
of information, and electronic components. 
Although not explicitly referred to as a specific form of support, the French 
government gives mandates to the MOD to prioritize the preservation of R&D capabilities 
in certain key technologies and to implement periodic assessments (Minister of Defence of 
France, 2013). Kane (2009) explains that the French government draws on private R&D, 
and reimburses a portion of their costs. The reimbursement rate for defense contractors 
varies from 2% to 6% of contract amounts, depending on the industrial sector and other 
criteria (Kane, 2009). Coordination of all matters related to R&D in the defense sector is 
carried out by the directorate for research, studies, and techniques (DRET) under the DGA. 
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(3) Policies Targeted to Support Enterprises With Global Comparative 
Advantage 
SMEs have an important role in the defense industry, and the French government 
recognizes this. The 2013 French White Paper on Defence and National Security (Minister 
of Defense of France, 2013) mentions that the defense industry makes a significant 
contribution to the French economy. The white paper also mentions there are nearly 4,000 
companies in the defense industry, as well as a large number of SMEs. Therefore, support 
for SMEs is very important. The white paper does not describe the specific support for 
SMEs, only saying that French SMEs would be provided guidance by professional defense 
organizations, with the support of the state. 
(4) Policies That Help Firms Access Global Supply Chains 
Given the current national and European market conditions where demand for arms 
has declined, this has resulted in excess capacity. Therefore, the industry needs to find new 
markets outside of France and Europe. In the 2013 French White Paper on Defence and 
National Security (Minister of Defense of France, 2013), the French government stated the 
importance of an active export policy, particularly for sales outside of Europe. It explained 
in the white paper that the French government believed that its armament export policy 
would be an effective and competitive solution to meet the needs of its allies and support 
the sustainability of its economy and defense industry. 
(5) Offset Policies 
France does not officially mention the implementation of offsets for its defense 
industry in its policies because the French are somewhat skeptical of offsets. They 
recognize that offsets increase prices and create inefficiencies in the market. However, in 
practice, France demands offsets whenever possible to improve and develop its defense 
industry (Eliassen, 2002).  
The French do not believe that international cooperation is a form of offsets, but 
they do believe that international cooperation benefits the development of the defense 
industry (Eliassen, 2002). Therefore, France initiated a cooperation program among 
European countries. One example of this program is the joint development of the Tiger 
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Eurocopter between France and Germany (Eurocopter Tiger [EC665] Attack Helicopter, 
n.d.). 
In so doing, the French government is not responsible for the offset between 
industrial companies; the responsibility belongs to the industrial companies involved. The 
DGA acts only if the French government has an offset obligation with foreign 
governments, and does not intervene in the offset obligation between foreign governments 
and French companies (Eliassen, 2002). 
3. Tier III: South Korea 
A developing country in Asia, South Korea is in a volatile area South Korea is still 
technically in conflict with its neighbors, North Korea and China. As a result, South Korea 
has invested heavily in its defense industry which earned USD $85,569 million in revenues 
in 2013 (SIPRI, 2014). Figure 9 shows sales made by South Korean companies listed in 
the world’s top 100 arms-producing companies, according to the SIPRI. 
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According to global security organizations, based on historical data from South 
Korea’s defense industry, the industry can be described as follows: Starting in the mid-
1960s, when South Korea relied on its allies (in this case, the United States), all of its 
equipment was procured from the United States, and South Korea did not have the ability 
to produce its own weapons. South Korea developed a policy to establish its own defense 
industry by embracing its allies. Therefore, in 1971, the South Korean Ministry of Defense 
created the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA). The DPA’s main duty is to manage all 
procurement of South Korean defense articles, from material procurement to military 
construction projects, as well as to manage the logistics supply, set up acquisition 
agreements, and standardize the defense articles that are acquired. In the same year, South 
Korea started to build its own simple weapons by obtaining licenses from the United States. 
South Korea started assembling Colt M-16 rifles to support its basic military needs; it was 
not authorized to produce more than that. Based on the industrial classification provided 
by Bitzinger (2009), this action placed South Korea in the tier III arms-producing countries, 
meaning it could support its basic needs by copying the articles and technology from other 
countries without any further development (Global Security.Org, 2014). 
In the mid-1970s, the government began the assembly of not only Colt M-16 rifles, 
but also other articles, such as mortars, grenades, and mines, and it started to produce 
ammunition for its own military needs with U.S. assistance. The government supported the 
development of its defense industry by introducing three laws, better known as “Seoul’s 
Policy”: the Defense Industry Law of 1973, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces 
Build-up Improvement Plan of 1974, and the Defense Tax Law of 1975. These three laws 
provide clear guidance to the defense industry including incentives for funding businesses. 
The government also invested its funds in the steel industry, electronics industry, and 
shipbuilding companies. The military budget became a priority in South Korea’s national 
budget (Global Security.Org, 2014).  
By 1990 the South Korean defense industry provided 70% of its weapon 
requirements. This provided South Korea the ability to engage in joint ventures and joint 
production with key allies. In 1990, South Korea became a leader in shipbuilding, and this 
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achievement attracted foreign investors, including countries and financial organizations 
(Global Security.Org, 2014). 
By 2007, South Korea claimed it was 100% self-sufficient in traditional weapon 
systems, and it intended to continue improving its ability to produce advanced weapons as 
it aimed to raise its profile in the global defense industry (Global Security.Org, 2014). 
The government enacted several policies to protect and sustain its defense industry. 
The four main policies are: 
a. A policy for offsets; 
b. A policy for export development via marketing support and assistance; 
c. A policy for increasing competitiveness in the domestic defense industry;  
d. A policy for enhancing transparency and coordination in defense 
procurement. 
These policies jointly affect the development of the South Korean defense industry. 
They can be explored further in the context of the six policies common in the defense 
industry defined by Berkok et al. (2012): 
(1) Improve Coordination Between Government and the Defense Industry 
South Korea’s procurement organization is called the DPA. In order to improve the 
transparency and effectiveness of arms trades, the DPA was converted into the Defense 
Acquisition Procurement Agency (DAPA) in 2006. This organization manages all 
acquisition projects and is also responsible for making connections between government 
and the domestic defense industry. . Lessons learned from the past show that a lack of 
coordination and supervision in this industry resulted in products of questionable quality 
and where there was limited transparency. The government has a policy for ensuring that 
only qualified personnel apply for jobs as team member at DAPA, and provide on-the-job 
training and other professional advancement programs to improve transparency and quality 
assurance in the defense industry. The government also manages an integrated defense 
program management information system. This system promotes transparency and 
coordination between the government, DAPA, and the defense industry (Kim, 2010). 
 55 
(2) Policies That Encourage and Support Research 
The DAPA, through its authorities, prioritizes bids from contractors who offer to 
transfer technology. The South Korean government requires foreign contractors to provide 
an offset of technical training in every contract in order to transfer knowledge. Contractors 
can also provide third parties in the domestic defense industry R&D, as well as product 
testing. Other offset agreements between foreign companies and the South Korean 
government set up joint research to develop new technologies by sending teams to the 
company or its research facilities (Berkok et al., 2012). 
(3) Policies Targeted to Support Enterprises With Global Comparative 
Advantage 
The government still subsidizes SMEs to improve their power to compete in highly 
competitive global markets, hoping in the long run they will survive and become 
sustainable without any government assistance. This is a critical point for South Korea: 
turning from a policy of import substitution to export promotion. The subsidies encourage 
companies to vertically and horizontally integrate and innovate to survive and thrive in 
global markets (Berkok et al., 2012). 
(4) Policies That Help Firms Access Global Supply Chains 
The South Korean government realized that, in order to compete internationally 
with its defense products, it needed strong marketing. To provide smaller companies a fair 
chance to compete and win contracts, the government established a marketing consortium. 
This consortium attempts to match customer needs with small company capabilities. This 
is one form of policy support and assistance provided by the government to protect and 
develop its domestic industry. This policy may have contributed to the increase of South 
Korea’s exports, from $1 billion in 2004 to $2.4 billion in 2011 (Global Security.Org, 
2014). 
(5) Policies That Create a Pro-Competitive Environment 
The DAPA, as a government body that manages the acquisition process and the 
development of the defense industry in South Korea, required the government to 
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discontinue its policy to support and protect infant industries, and to promote competition 
and avoid inadvertently discriminating against other industries (Berkok et al., 2012). 
(6) Offset Policies 
The main reason given for the South Korean government for its offset policy is to 
upgrade its capability to produce high tech weapon systems. The goal of South Korea’s 
procurement organization called the DAPA (Defense Acquisition Procurement Agency), 
previously called the DPA (Defense Procurement Agency), has been transformed into a 
guideline called the 2020 Defense Reform Plan, which provides rules for implementing 
offsets: 
1. All projects greater than or equal to $10 million should involve offsets; 
contracts below this level are subject to DAPA review, which decides 
whether or not to apply an offset policy. 
2. The offset requirement is a minimum of 50% of the contract value. 
3. The offset guidance is 60% for direct offsets for related defense 
technology development in domestic production, and can be 40% for 
indirect offsets, such as investments in domestic companies, or the 
establishment of new ones. 
4. The maximum time to execute the contract with offsets is five years. 
5. The penalty for a contractor that cannot fulfil an offset obligation 10% of 
the contract value, and includes an exclusion from future projects (Berkok 
et al., 2012). 
In 2011 the United States exported more than $1 billion in armaments to South 
Korea, and South Korea received $500 million in offsets from the U.S. company that had 
the procurement contract, to help develop its defense industry, especially in R&D (Global 
Security.Org, 2014).  
B. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
Because the defense industry can play an important role in the survival of the state, 
many governments grant some priority to their defense industry. However, based on a 
careful review of literature, both benefits and costs appear when government enacts 
policies regarding the defense industry. The costs and benefits discussed below are based 
on Berkok’s six common policies (Berkok, 2012): 
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1. Policy to Improve Coordination between Government and the Defense 
Industry 
Government, as the primary stakeholder in the defense industry, often enacts 
policies to control that industry and improve coordination between itself and the defense 
industry. The examples drawn from several countries suggest that governments prefer to 
establish a lead agency. For example, South Korea has the DAPA, France the DGA, and 
the United States the MIBP. Governments grant these agencies the responsibility and 
power to oversee their defense industries. This action can offer benefits to the government 
and the defense industry: 
a. There is better coordination between government and industry; 
governments can address their own interests, but also take account of those 
of industry; the industry can lobby the government to help develop the 
defense industry. This policy can reduce bureaucracy and accelerate 
development of the defense industry (Berkok et al., 2012). 
b. By establishing a single agency to communicate with the defense industry, 
governments can provide supervision and propose actions to support its 
domestic defense industry. In globally competitive markets, national 
interests can rapidly be addressed based on data already collected by the 
agency (Berkok et al., 2012). 
Unfortunately, even though the government and defense industry can gain from this 
policy, there are costs to this implementation: 
a. Monopolies, with their power granted by government, can endanger both 
the defense industry and the government. Misleading analysis or casual 
reviews can lead to poor decisions by the government. The other issue is 
transparency. An organization with monopoly power tends to build its own 
bureaucracy that is not familiar to outsiders and adds costs and promotes 
unproductive actions (Berkok et al., 2012).  
b. Too much power concentrated in a government organization may be used 
to commit fraud based on the fraud triangle: if there is opportunity; pressure 
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in the organization; personal interest; and rationalization from the person or 
group that commits fraud. Power concentrated within a procurement agency 
creates an opportunity for government capture. The risk is that defense 
industry companies are tempted to invest in influencing officials and 
politicians for protection and other favorable policies, instead of investing 
to improve the product or service to make their products globally 
competitive. The most common fraudulent actions are corruption, bribery, 
kickbacks, and other actions that benefit a company or industry at the 
expense of taxpayers (Berkok et al., 2012). 
2. Policies That Encourage and Support Research and Development 
Policies that promote R&D also involve benefits and costs: 
a. Government, as a stakeholder in the defense industry, often creates an 
environment to support domestic research through subsidies, offsets or 
other policies. Some countries successfully invent new technologies that 
make them competitive in the global marketplace. South Korea, for 
example, started to build its defense industry in 1970 by getting the license 
to assemble small conventional weapons from U.S. companies in order to 
fulfill its own basic military requirements. The government imposed 
regulations that required offsets from foreign companies to provide R&D 
domestically or as joint research in the foreign company, or in a local third 
party company. Partly as a result, by 2007, South Korea provided 100% of 
its own basic needs for conventional weapon systems and became a global 
competitor in shipbuilding and other defense equipment (Global 
Security.Org, 2014).  
b. South Korea, for the first time in 1970, was classified as a tier III country 
based on its capability to reproduce and copy armaments based on licenses 
from the United States. The government imposed policies supporting R&D, 
and slowly removed subsidies as the infant industry expanded in order to 
make it more independent. The government provided subsidies for SMEs 
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mainly to assist them in competing globally and to encourage them to adopt 
new technologies. By early 2000, South Korea had become a country with 
the capability to modify and adopt new technology, upgrading its status to 
a tier II industry with an important role in the global defense market (Global 
Security.Org, 2014). 
The government support of R&D also had consequences: 
a. Supporting a domestic defense industry affects other priorities because 
R&D requires a large budget to accomplish its goals. R&D is not always 
successful; there are risks of failing, and further research is then needed, 
requiring additional funding (Berkok et al., 2012). 
b. The policies require that any contractor transfer knowledge through joint 
research or invest in a domestic research company. This agreement needs 
to be carefully managed to ensure relevant research is conducted and 
integrated into new systems that are efficient and effective (Berkok et al., 
2012). 
c. The risk of corruption is also significant given the large budgets involved 
in any government policy that supports domestic companies to engage in 
research. Unfortunately, if the research efforts fail, further research and 
more funds are required. There is a risk individuals or research companies 
could collaborate with corrupt government officials or agencies that have 
the power to approve funding (Berkok et al., 2012). 
3. Policies Targeted at Supporting Enterprises with a Global 
Comparative Advantage 
There are many ways governments support their SMEs, for example, through 
subsidized funding or policies that protect them in competition. This action can bring 
benefits to SMEs and the government (Berkok et al., 2012) as follows: 
a. By supporting SME companies, the government provides them an 
opportunity to survive and compete with other big companies globally. 
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b. By providing SME companies with contracts and maintaining their 
capabilities, these capabilities can be used to satisfy government 
requirements. 
c. By supporting SME companies, the government can maintain some 
competition in its defense industry if large companies receive less 
government support. 
However, there are possible negative consequences of government support for 
SMEs: 
a. By providing SMEs with assistance through funding or regulation, the 
government indirectly creates dependent companies that lack creativity 
because they become dependent on government largesse; therefore, there is 
no incentive for them to compete or develop/integrate new technologies; 
b. This support can also result in unfair competition if the government favors 
contracts completed by SMEs. Another corruption risk occurs when 
contract specifications are specified to match a particular SMEs’ abilities, 
favoring that SME at the expense of others (Berkok et al., 2012). 
4. Policies That Help Firms Access Global Supply Chains 
Governments can support their defense industries via regulations to help them 
access global markets, not only through marketing their products, but also in facilitating 
acquisition of raw materials or conducting R&D (Berkok et al., 2012). 
The benefits come along with costs. One consequence of this policy is that opening 
global markets can harm local domestic suppliers to the domestic defense industry. Another 
issue is that raw materials purchased from other countries for the domestic defense industry 
can lead to dependency that can undermine government’s goal to promote self-sufficiency 
(Berkok et al., 2012). 
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5. Policies That Create a Pro-Competitive Environment 
The benefit of global competition is that it encourages efficiency and creativity to 
produce the best possible products and services which is required for a defense industry to 
be sustainable and compete globally. 
Competitive environments also involve costs because there are winners and losers. 
In opening domestic markets, foreign companies can access the market, and if there is no 
protection for small companies without a comparative advantage, they will be defeated by 
globalization. This situation can threaten a country’s goal to develop its defense industry 
(Bitzinger, 2009). 
6. Offset Policies 
The implementation of the offset policy can offer some benefits: 
a. For some tier II and tier III countries offset policies are sometimes used to 
develop advanced technology provided by a foreign company from a higher 
tier country. Direct offset policies in Tier II countries can encourage a 
transfer of technology and knowledge from foreign companies that 
improves the capabilities of the defense industry, which can be further 
advanced with additional research and development (Bitzinger, 2009). 
b. Adopting new innovations and upgrades can allow countries to become 
more independent and globally competitive  (Bitzinger, 2009).  
The offset policy also comes with costs: 
a. Offsets are not free. Offset policies will increase the price foreign firms 
charge the buyer to compensate for any transfers of technology or 
knowledge. It may in fact be less expensive to obtain the product and R&D 
in two separate contracts rather than bundled in one large contract that 
reduces the number of competing suppliers (and the benefits of competition) 
in the market (Berkok et al., 2012). 
b. There is no guarantee that the technology transferred as part of an offset 
agreement is the latest technology available. There is even a chance that the 
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technology will soon be obsolete and that more funding will be required to 
upgrade systems (Berkok et al., 2012). 
c. Offset policies are extremely susceptible to corruption. (Magahy et al., 
2010). Since offsets are often in-kind benefits (Training, R&D; school 
buildings; hospitals; etc.), they can easily be manipulated and require 
careful oversight to ensure delivery of desired results (Berkok et al., 2012; 
Global Security.Org, 2014). 
In developing government policies to support sustainable defense industries, the 
benefits and costs of defense policies need to be carefully considered in order to identify 
the most appropriate policies for a country. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Governments, as stakeholders in their defense industries, often develop policies to 
secure the success of their domestic defense industries. Experts have classified countries 
with defense industries into three tiers: tier I for critical innovator countries, tier II for 
adapter and modifier countries, and tier III for reproducer and copier countries. This 
classification is based on a country’s defense industry capabilities as well as the level of 
independence, capital, and government influence in the industry; the less government 
influence, the more sustainable the defense industry.  
Governments support their domestic defense industries through a variety of 
policies. Six general government policies are commonly used in order to support defense 
industries. 
Along with benefits, there are costs related to policy implementation. Every country 
reviewing its defense industry policy must decide whether the costs outweigh the benefits. 
The United States and France are examples of countries that have highly developed 
defense industries, although they do not set specific formal policies. The United States 
treats its defense industry the same as other industries and heavily emphasizes competition 
and the free market. In contrast, the defense industry in France has often relied on 
substantial public support and even government ownership. 
World-class U.S. companies like Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed 
Martin are heavily engaged in a competitive global defense industry. However, applying a 
mostly free-market competition policy is facilitated when industries have strong businesses 
and their own cutting-edge technology and a comparative advantage in the marketplace.  
Even though the United States promotes free-market competition, the competition 
is often limited to domestic firms and U.S.-allied countries that have reciprocal 
relationships with the United States. 
Among the six common policies often adopted for the defense industry, many 
countries attempt to: 
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a. Improve coordination between government and the defense industry. For 
example, in the UK, the MOD acts as the coordinator, and the DGA has the 
same function in France. 
b. Encourage and support research. The United States, the UK, and France, 
have spent substantial amounts of their budgets to support research in their 
respective countries. 
c. Help firms access global supply chains. The United States, the UK, France, 
and South Korea provide significant support for their defense industries to 
help them compete in global markets.  
d. Offsets. Many countries adopt some form of offset policy, especially 
countries whose defense industries are not yet mature and successful. 
Despite the risk of corruption, they require offsets to transfer technology, 
engage in joint research, facilitate joint production, or transfer knowledge 
through training. 
The policies above are the most common. Other policies are less frequently applied: 
a. Create a pro-competitive environment. This policy uses competition to 
encourage the manufacturing of high-quality products, but is usually 
applied only in countries where domestic defense industries have matured 
and are sustainable, and also where there are multiple competing suppliers 
(e.g., Boeing and Lockheed Martin in aircraft manufacturing).  
b. Support global enterprises with comparative advantage. There is no 
government policy that explicitly mentions support for firms to develop a 
global comparative advantage. Generally, government support for the 
defense industry is to secure supplies for the armed forces and to maintain 
the surge capabilities of the defense firms. Some European countries, such 
as France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, even work together to develop and 
manufacture joint military equipment, such as the Tiger Eurocopter and 
NH-90, in attempts to achieve efficiencies in equipping their armed forces. 
c. In fact, there is always an opportunity for countries to develop a 
comparative advantage in some part of the defense market. For example, 
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while U.S. weapon systems are highly sophisticated, they are also very 
expensive, and not all countries can afford to buy them, or can only do so 
in small numbers. So other exporter countries may have a comparative 
advantage in selling less expensive, lower-tech systems that are good 
enough for other countries.  
Governments must also carefully consider the costs of any policy Costs that 
commonly appear include: 
a. Corruption risks. When the government appoints an organization to take 
care of all defense industry business, this kind of power can lead to 
corruption. The government has to have checks and balances to minimize 
the risk. . The government provides subsidies to certain domestic defense 
companies in order to promote competitiveness and protect them from 
global competition. This can include large budgets for research and 
development. The government should have procedures in place to identify 
any red flags and take appropriate action to minimize the risk of corruption 
that can not only destroy the defense industry, but also the security of the 
country. 
b. The strategic issue regarding dependence on other countries. The 
government goal of adopting policies to promote and sustain a defense 
industry is often aimed at achieving self-sufficiency. But both the benefits 
and costs of policies must be considered. The high price paid for policies 
that encourage self-sufficiency may not in fact yield the desired benefit of 
a sustainable and globally competitive defense industry. 
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APPENDIX  
The following is an executive summary written in our native language for the 
convenience of our countrymen and women. 
 
Seluruh angkatan bersenjata di dunia membutuhkan peralatan militer untuk 
melaksanakan tugasnya. Kebutuhan peralatan militer dapat dipenuhi salah satunya dengan 
memiliki industri pertahanan dalam negeri. Pemerintah berperan penting dalam kemajuan 
industri dalam negeri disebabkan fungsi pemerintah sebagai pembeli dan pembuat aturan.  
Industri pertahanan dunia secara umum dapat dikelompokkan menjadi tiga yang 
sekaligus menunjukkan tingkat kemajuan industri pertahanan suatu Negara. Kelompok 
tersebut adalah: critical innovator; adapter dan modifier; dan copier dan reproducer. 
Untuk memajukan industri pertahanan dalam negerinya, suatu Negara membuat 
kebijakan yang disesuaikan dengan situasi dan kondisi Negara tersebut. Sehingga terdapat 
banyak kebijakan berbeda yang dibuat dan diterapkan oleh Negara-negara di dunia.  
Pada MBA Professional Report ini, kami mengulas dan menganalisa enam 
kebijakan umum yang banyak diterapkan oleh Negara-negara di dunia. Kebijakan tersebut 
adalah: 1) kebijakan yang meningkatkan koordinasi antara pemerintah dan pelaku industri 
pertahanan; 2) kebijakan yang mendukung kegiatan riset pertahanan; 3) kebijakan untuk 
mendukung perusahaan yang memiliki nilai komparatif dalam persaingan global; 4) 
kebijakan yang membantu perusahaan dalam negeri untuk bisa mengakses rantai pasokan 
global; 5) kebijakan untuk menciptakan iklim industri yang mendukung kompetisi; dan 6) 
kebijakan offset. 
Dari hasil analisa penerapan enam kebijakan tersebut di empat Negara yang 
mewakili tiap-tiap kelompok tersebut di atas, yaitu Amerika Serikat, Inggris, Prancis dan 
Korea Selatan, didapatkan kesimpulan sebagai berikut: 
(1) Di antara enam kebijakan tersebut, terdapat empat kebijakan yang sering 
diterapkan oleh Negara-negara tersebut, yaitu: 1) kebijakan yang 
meningkatkan koordinasi antara pemerintah dan pelaku industri pertahanan; 
2) kebijakan yang mendukung kegiatan riset pertahanan; 3) kebijakan yang 
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membantu perusahaan dalam negeri untuk bisa mengakses rantai pasokan 
global; 4) kebijakan offset; 
(2) Dalam penerapannya, perlu diperhatikan adanya resiko yang dapat timbul 
sebagai berikut: 1) resiko terjadinya korupsi, 2) isu strategis mengenai 
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